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ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
CPLR 3101Wl: Court allows discovery of prior claims satisfied out of
defendant doctor's malpractice insurance policy.
CPLR 3101(f), a verbatim adoption of rule 26(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 24 significantly broadens the scope
of discovery allowed in New York by permitting a party to obtain
disclosure of the existence and contents of any insurance agree-
ment whose proceeds may be used either in satisfaction of a judg-
ment that may be entered in the action or for indemnification or
reimbursement of payments made to satisfy such a judgment.2a It
further provides that information so obtained is not, by the mere
reason of its disclosure, admissible at trial.26 The apparent purpose
of CPLR 3101 (f) is to facilitate and encourage negotiations between
counsel, thereby augmenting the chances for settlement.27
penalties for attorney neglect make no reference to expenses incurred. See cases cited note 5
supra.
24 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary at 8 (Supp. 1975).
25 CPLR 3101(f) states:
A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable
to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Information
concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in
evidence at trial. For purpose of this subdivision, an application for insurance shall
not be treated as part of an insurance agreement.
Prior to the recent enactment of CPLR 3101(0, ch. 668, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1072, the
discoverability of insurance policies was wholly dependent upon a finding pursuant to CPLR
3 101(a), formerly CPA 288, that such disclosure was "material and necessary in the prosecu-
tion or defense of [the] action." Consequently, disclosure was limited to two situations. See
3A WK&M 3101.58, at 31-156.1. Discovery was permitted if relevant to an essential issue
in the case. See, e.g., Guilianelle v. Brownell, 7 App. Div. 2d 691, 179 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d Dep't
1958) (mem.) (insurance policy of alleged employer disclosed to prove agency relationship);
Martyn v. Braun, 270 App. Div. 768, 59 N.Y.S.2d 588 (2d Dep't 1946) (mem.) (policy
discoverable to prove defendant's ownership of property causing injury). Discovery was also
allowed where jurisdiction was predicated upon the attachment of an insurance policy. See,
e.g., Tickel v. Oddo, 66 Misc. 2d 386, 320 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971); Day
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 63 Misc. 2d 497, 311 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1969); Mirabile v. Fitzmaurice, 59 Misc. 2d 239, 298 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1969). With the exception of these rare situations, disclosure of insurance policies was
usually disallowed. See, e.g., Mosca v. Pensky, 42 App. Div. 2d 708, 345 N.Y.S.2d 606 (2d
Dep't 1973) (mem.), affd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 764, 320 N.E.2d 864, 362 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1974).
26 CPLR 3101(f) effects no change in the rules of evidence regarding the admissibility at
trial of insurance coverage. For a synopsis of the New York law on the admissibility of such
coverage, see W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 169 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973).
27 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary at 8 (Supp. 1975); 3A WK&M 1 3101.58.
Three years before the adoption of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2), in a case where he reluctantly
disallowed pretrial disclosure of insurance coverage, the then United States District Judge
Mansfield explained why permitting such disclosure might facilitate and encourage settle-
ments:
This Court has witnessed the dismal waste of time and effort, both on the part of
the parties and the court, in cases where an early disclosure of limited policy limits
would have led to prompt settlements that were not reached until the eve of trial,
when such information was first revealed after needless pretrial discovery and
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Pursuant to this provision, the plaintiff in Folgate v. Brookhaven
Memorial Hospital2 8 served a notice of discovery and inspection on
the defendant doctor in order to obtain information regarding his
medical malpractice insurance policy. He sought, inter alia, disclo-
sure of the number of claims brought against the defendant during
the term of the policy, the amount sought in each of those claims,
and the amount already paid in satisfaction of each claim. The
defendant, believing that the information regarding previous
claims was not within the scope of discovery permitted by 3101(f),
responded to the plaintiff's notice by disclosing only the policy
period and limits. The plaintiff therefore moved for an order
compelling the defendant to comply fully with the notice of discov-
ery and inspection. According to the plaintiff, since there was an
absolute limit to the insurer's liability for malpractice claims against
the defendant during the applicable policy period, the information
sought was indispensable in formulating a prejudgment determina-
tion as to what funds would be available from the policy in the
event of a recovery. 29
The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted the plaintiff's
motion, holding that the discovery of information revealing the
actual amount available from the insurance policy is consistent with
both the language and intent of CPLR 3101(f).30 In analyzing the
preparation for trial. Aside from such unnecessary consumption of time and effort
.... the effect frequently is to disrupt the court's schedule and cause loss of trial
time for many needy prospective litigants.
... [I]n cases where liability is doubtful but potential recovery large, the insurer
on a small policy might refrain from settlement and refuse disclosure of the policy
limits for the reason that it would not lose a great deal by going to trial and it might
win the case outright. Disclosure might pressure the insurance company into a
settlement within the policy limits ....
Clauss v. Danker, 264 F. Supp. 246, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The viewpoint that pretrial
disclosure of policy limits below the amount of the damages sought would encourage early
settlements was also espoused by proponents of CPLR 3101 (f). See, e.g., Letter from the New
York Trial Lawyers Ass'n to the New York Legislature, June 2, 1975, on file in the St. John's
Law Review Office. The counterargument is of course that any benefit to be gained from
pretrial discovery of insurance agreements is negated by the existence of instances where the
defendant's insurance coverage is greater than the offered settlement price and the plaintiff
proceeds to trial in the hope of obtaining a larger sum. See Developments in the Lail -
Discoveiy, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1018-19 (1961). One commentator, however, has stated that
"there is little empirical evidence to support this argument." Schwartz, The New Federal Rules
on Discovery, 55 MASS. L.Q. 345, 348 (1970). Having considered the arguments pro and con,
the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, in its comments regarding FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(2), appears to have concluded that pretrial discovery of insurance coverage will
bring about more settlements than it will prevent. See ADVISORY COMMIT-rEE, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RELATING TO DISCOVERY, in 48
F.R.D. 487, 498-99 (1969) (Advisory Committee Notes) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Notes].
28. Misc. 2d -, 381 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976).
2 9 Id. at -, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 385. The policy limits were $500,000/$1,500,000, the latter
figure representing the total amount available to satisfy all claims against the defendant. Id.
3 0 d.
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language of the statute, Justice Lazer observed that the statutory
phrase "to satisfy part or all of a judgment" implies a legislative
intent "to make possible a realistic assessment of the available
insurance coverage. ' 31 The justice noted that this position is sup-
ported by the commentaries addressed to federal rule 26(b)(2),
which assert in part that disclosure of insurance coverage should
lead to a " 'realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and
litigation strategy are based on knowledge and not speculation.' "32
Justice Lazer rejected the defendant's argument that the liberal
construction urged by the plaintiff would turn CPLR 3101 (f) into a
device for discovery of information, such as evidence of other acts
of negligence, which, unlike the information actually regarding the
insurance agreement, 33 might be used at the trial to the detriment
of the defendant. 34 According to the justice, other rules of evi-
dence would apparently prevent this type of prejudicial effect.35
Since Folgate seems to have been a case of first impression,
Justice Lazer could cite no New York decisional law to support his
conclusions.36 He was able to find one federal case construing rule
' Id.
32 Id., quoting Advisory Notes, supra note 27, at 499. While the legislative history of
CPLR 3101(f) is scant, it is generally presumed by courts and commentators that the statute's
purposes are the same as those underlying the federal rule. See Monell v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 85 Misc. 2d 323, 324, 378 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (Sup. Ct. Orange
County 1976); Hernandez v. Jones, 84 Misc. 2d 805, 806, 376 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1975); Rautine v. Preston, 84 Misc. 2d 156, 158, 374 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282-83
(Sup. Ct. Chemung County 1975); Letter from Adolf Homburger, Professor of Law at the
State University of New York at Buffalo, to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to Governor Carey, July
17, 1975, on file in the St. John's Law Review Office; Letter from Carol H. Katz, Assistant
Regional Director to the FTC, to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to Governor Carey,July 17, 1975, on
file in the St. John's Law Review Office; Letter from the New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on
the CPLR to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to Governor Carey, July 15, 1975, on file in the St. John's
Law Review Office.33 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
3- Misc. 2d at -, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
" Since prior acts of negligence are not admissible to create an inference of negligence,
see Wooster v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R.R., 25 N.Y.S. 378, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't 1893),
Justice Lazer noted that the evidence could not be used to create such an inference in the
present action. - Misc. 2d at -, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 386. Nor could such information be
introduced as character evidence. Id. "[T]he character of a party may not be shown in a civil
case to raise an inference that he acted in conformity therewith on the occasion in question."
W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 158 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973). Insofar as employing the
evidence of prior malpractice to impeach credibility, Justice Lazer noted that it would be of
little use, since extrinsic evidence could not be admitted to show a prior criminal, immoral,
or vicious act, see People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 200-01, 93 N.E.2d 637, 638-39 (1950); -
Misc. 2d at -, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 386. Moreover, it is doubtful that a doctor could even be
questioned as to previous acts of malpractice, for previous acts can be used to impeach
credibility only if they tend to show moral turpitude. See People v. Montlake, 184 App. Div.
578, 172 N.Y.S. 102 (2d Dep't 1918). Since "moral turpitude" has been interpreted to mean
conduct that is dishonest, unprincipled, immoral, or contrary to justice, see, e.g., United
States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 30 F. Supp. 767, 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), prior acts of medical
negligence do not appear to qualify for such use.
16 In view of its relatively recent enactment, CPLR 3 101(f) received little judicial scrutiny
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26(b)(2), however, which he. regarded as being "directly on point"
and supportive of his interpretation of the rule's counterpart in
New York. Union Carbide Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.37 involved
a dispute between two defendant insurers concerning their respec-
tive liability for the satisfaction of a judgment previously rendered
against the plaintiff insured. Defendant Travelers served inter-
rogatories on codefendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company in
an attempt to secure, among other things, information concerning
charges made against the plaintiff's policy for the settlement of
other claims. The district court allowed discovery of this informa-
tion, stating that the "possible exhaustion of policy limits by other
claims are matters [sic] subject to discovery. 38
Justice Lazer's citation of Union Carbide as "on point" is subject
to criticism. While it is true that the district court expressly cited
rule 26(b)(2) as "specifically" opening up to discovery the informa-
tion sought by Travelers, 39 the reason given by the court for per-
mitting the interrogatories was that since the issue in question was
insurance coverage, the requested information was relevant to the
subject matter of the case. 40 Furthermore, the court noted, the
interrogatories were "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence. '41 This analysis is not relevant to a finding
that information is discoverable under rule 26(b)(2), but relates to
the provision in the federal rules that permits "discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action .... 42 On the other hand, in
Folgate, disclosure was dearly not obtainable under the general
discovery provision in the CPLR, which similarly permits the dis-
covery of evidence relevant to an essential issue in the case. 3
prior to the Folgate decision. See Tague v. Supe, 175 N.Y.L.J. 12, Jan. 19, 1976, at 11, col. 5
(Sup. CL Suffolk County) (McCarthy, J.) (information regarding insurance policies affording
excess coverage held discoverable); Monell v. International Business Machs. Corp., 85 Misc.
2d 323, 378 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1976) (discovery of policy permitted
while appeal to Court of Appeals was pending); Rubenstein v. DeVoe, 84 Misc. 2d 477, 376
N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975) (CPLR 3101(f) applicable where plaintiff ready
for trial before its enactment); Hernandez v.Jones, 84 Misc. 2d 805, 376 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup.
CL Queens County 1975) (discovery of policy mandatory unless plaintiff agrees to accept
true copy or sworn statement); Rautine v. Preston, 84 Misc. 2d 156, 374 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup.
CL Chemung County 1975) (that pretrial proceedings were incomplete is no bar to 3101(f)
discovery).
37 61 F.R.D. 411 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (mem.). Reported applications of the federal rule are
few in number. See 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.62[2] (2d ed. 1975).
38 61 F.R.D. at 413.
3 9 Id.4 0 
Id.
41Id.
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
43 The discovery permitted in Union Carbide would clearly have been allowed under the
general discovery provisions of CPLR 3101(a) since the information sought was relevant to
1976]
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Accordingly, the state court had to confront the issue of whether
discovery of other claims comes within the scope of 3101(f).
Nevertheless, in view of the statute's purpose to promote
realistic negotiations, the Folgate court appears to have reached the
proper decision. Narrowly reading CPLR 3101 (f) to restrict discov-
ery to information on the face of the insurance policy44 would
clearly emasculate the statute in situations where information not
disclosed by the policy itself affects the amount of money actually
available to the plaintiff should he be awarded judgment. On the
other hand, the liberal construction given in Folgate ensures CPLR
3101(f)'s viability as a settlement-inducing statute.4"
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3215(e): Predemand complaint viewed as sufficient to satisfy re-
quirements for entry of default judgment.
Service of a summons alone, unaccompanied by either notice
or a complaint, commences a civil action 46 and necessitates a de-
fendant's appearance4 7 on pain of default. 48 Before a judgment of
default can be entered, however, a plaintiff is required under
CPLR 3215(e) to file proof that either a summons and complaint or
a summons and notice49 have been duly served upon the defen-
dant. Consequently, when failure to appear follows service of a
bare summons, entry of a default judgment is precluded 5 unless
an essential issue in the case, viz insurance coverage. See note 25 supra. What funds are
available under a malpractice insurance policy is obviously irrelevant, however, to the issue
of whether a doctor has committed malpractice.
" The defendant in Folgate argued that since CPLR 3101(f) is in derogation of the
common law, it must be strictly construed. - Misc. 2d at -, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 385. Justice
Lazer properly ignored this point, however, since CPLR 104 impliedly makes inapplicable
the rule calling for strict construction of statutes changing the common law. See FOURTH REP.
46.
4 Cf. Monell v. International Business Machs. Corp., 85 Misc. 2d 323, 324, 378
N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1976).
46 CPLR 304.
" A defendant who has been served with a summons by personal delivery within the
State must appear within 20 days of such service. Service of the summons by any other
method as well as service without the State require the defendant's appearance within 30
days after service is complete. CPLR 320(a); 1 WK&M $1 320.02.
" A default occurs when a party fails to appear, plead, or timely carry out other
procedural steps in the litigation. CPLR 3215(a); 8 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 63:64, at 717 (1966);
H. WACHTELL, NEw YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 321 (4th ed. 1973).
" Before a default judgment can be entered against a party, he must be apprised of the
subject matter of the action and the relief sought. Accordingly, if a plaintiff wishes to
preserve his right to judgment in the event of default, the summons must be accompanied
by a copy of the complaint or a notice stating the object of the action and the monetary
amount for which judgment will be taken in the event of default. See CPLR 305(b), 3215(e).
" Several commentators have expressed the view that the legislature did not intend the
service of a bare summons to preclude entry of a default judgment since such a harsh result
